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ABSTRACT 
In our research  we are developing methodologies  and 
tools to permit stochastic analyses  of CSP-based  system 
specifications. In  this regard, we have been developing 
morphisms  between  CSP-based  models  and  Petri net-based 
stochastic models. This process  has given us insight for 
further refinements  to the original CSP specifications  (i.e., 
identify potential failure processes  and  recovery  actions).  In 
order to create systems  that meet user needs  in terms of 
cost,  functionality,  performance  and reliability,  it  is 
essential  to relate the parameters  needed  for reliability 
analysis  to the user  level specification. 
Keywords:  Formal  specification,  CSP,  Petri  Nets, 
Reliability analysis,  Markov models. 
LINTRoDUCTION 
Computers are increasingly used in every day life  in 
today’s  society.  These  systems are  monitoring  and 
controlling complex and safety  critical systems.  It has  been 
conjectured that formal mathematically precise methods 
should  be used  to design  such  systems.  Among the benefits 
from using formal frameworks,  we include [Ostroff 921: 
l  In  the  process  of  formalizing  informal 
requirements,  ambiguities,  omissions,  and 
contradictions  will often be discovered. 
l  A  formal framework may lead to hierarchical 
semi-automated  system  development  methods. 
l  A formal model  can  be verified for correctness  by 
mathematical  methods  (rather  than by exhaustive 
testing). 
l  A  formally  verified  subsystem  can  be 
incorporated into a larger system with  greater 
confidence  that it will behave  as  specified. 
l  Different designs  can  be evaluated  and  compared. 
l  A  clear  specification  of  interactions  among 
various subsystems  may provide implementation 
insights  for avoiding performance  pitfalls. 
“When  it  comes  to  the  implementation  of 
specifications formally.  one does not do  it  by  writing 
programs and then trying  to prove  that they meet the 
specifications.  Instead,  one constructs  correct programs  in 
small  steps -  each step taking  the  specification  and 
producing  something  that  is  bit  closer  to  the  final 
program” [Hall  901. At  the other extreme, some formal 
specification and verification  methods strive for  “fool- 
proof”  or  “error-free”  designs.  A  proof  is  u  a 
demonstration that one formal  statement follows  from 
another, and the validity  of a statement depends  on the 
validity of the statement  from which it is derived.  Complex 
systems  are placed in environments that are difficult  to 
model accurately.  Thus, it is not feasible  (at least not cost- 
effective) to prove the correctness  of a designed  system  in 
real environments. One must be satisfied by  designing 
systems  that will  exhibit a high degree of dependability. 
Thus,  future  systems  will  be  designed  to  tolerate 
unpredictable  conditions  and operate  safely in the presence 
of hardware  or software  failures. 
The research  in formal specification  and verification of 
complex systems has often ignored the specification of 
stochastic  properties  of the system.  The normal practice is 
to derive designs and implementations of  systems from 
formal  specifications. Designers concurrently  develop 
stochastic  models  of the target systems  for the purpose  of 
reliability  and performance  analyses. While  detailed 
analyses  require  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
implementation  (hardware/software  failure modes,  failure 
distributions, service distributions, workload, etc.), it  is 
our belief that the cost of providing  a desired level of 
reliability  and performance can be related to user level 
specifications, even if  only in terms of upper and lower 
bounds. It  is also our  belief  that as specifications are 
refined into detailed designs  and actual implementations, 
the reliability  and performance  requirements  can also be 
refined  to reveal  the trade-offs  in design  alternatives. 
Stochastic Petri-nets  have  been used to  analyze 
complex  distributed  processing systems in  terms  of 
performance and reliability.  Numerous tools have been 
developed  for stochastic  analysis  of Petri nets (e.g., GSPN 
[Marsan 891,  GreatSPN [Chiola 891, SPNP [Ciardo 891). 
Petri nets however, are not very suitable for reasoning 
about  the functional correctness  of a system. 
We have  developed  an initial set  of rules for translating 
CSP  (Communicating  Sequential  Processes)  specifications 
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into  Petri  nets  [Kavi  933.  In  this  paper  we  will 
demonstrate,  by  using a simple example, (1) how CSP 
specifications can be converted into Petri nets, (2) how 
Petri nets can be embellished  with failure modes,  (3) how 
these  failure modes  can  be converted  into CSP  processes  so 
that the feasibility of certain  failure modes  can  be examined 
by the user, and (4) how Petri nets can be analyzed for 
reliability (using user  level information on failure rates). 
2.  FORMALISMS  FOR  SPECIFICATION 
AND  ANALYSIS 
Since  CSP  and  other  specification  models  are 
compositional, the usefulness  of an analysis is improved 
by  partitioning  large systems into  smaller subsystems 
whose reliability  can then be approximated judiciously, 
giving greater  comprehensibility and thereby  reducing the 
analysis complexity. It  is hoped that the insights gained 
will  lead to a set of tools for the specification  of functional 
and stochastic  properties,  as  well as  mechanical  proofs and 
analyses for  correctness, reliability  and performance 
measures. 
2.1  Communicating  Sequential  Processes.  The 
CSP model was developed  by Hoare  and later extended  by 
Olderog ([Hoare 851, [Olderog 861). A program in CSP 
consists  of  n  >  1  communicating  processes: this  is 
normally  represented using  the  parallel  composition 
operator (II), which  is associative: P =  {Pl  II P2 II .  .  .  ..I1 
Pn]. 
A  process’s actions  are visible  by  means of  its 
communications  with other processes  or the environment. 
The  set  of  symbols  representing  the  visible  actions 
comprise the  alphabet  (S)  for  the  process. Processes 
communicate synchronously by  sending and receiving 
messages:  the sending  and receiving actions  (or events)  are 
indicated using the input (?) and output (!) actions.  Pi?x is 
the action of  receiving a value sent by process Pi into 
variable x. Pj! <expression>  describes  the action  of sending 
the value of  the expression to Pj.  Synchronization  is 
accomplished by using complementary input and output 
commands  in  the  two  communicating  processes. 
Communication  can be made  selective  by providing guards, 
where  one of the alternative communication  actions  with a 
satisfied guard is selected. A  guarded  command has the 
general  syntax of the form <guard> +  <command  list>. A 
command  list is a set of commands  defining a sequence  of 
actions,  alternative actions  based  on either deterministic  or 
non-deterministic choice, recursive actions, or a STOP 
action.  Stop terminates (or  deadlocks) a process. The 
following summarizes  CSP syntax: 
P ::=  STOP I (a -+ P) I (I%)  I (P n  Q) 
l(Pk?)I(P  II,Q)I(p:Q)I(P-p) 
In CSP,  capitalized  names  are used  for process  names, 
and lower case  characters  are used  to denote  visible actions. 
Here, (a +  P) means,  action ‘a’  followed by P, (I%)  is the 
same  as P except action b is hidden, (PnQ)  represents  a 
non-deterministic  choice  between  P  and  Q,  (POQ) 
represents  a deterministic  choice  between  P and  Q, (P  II ,Q> 
shows  concurrent  processes  P and Q that synchronize  on 
action b, (P; Q) a sequence  between  P and Q, (px  l  P) is 
used  for recursion. 
2.1.1 THE CSP FOR  A RAll.-ROAD  CROSSING,  In this 
example, a Rail-Road intersection is specified. The gate 
closes  when a train arrives at the intersection  and remains 
closed  until the train leaves  the intersection. Although the 
problem statement can be extended to handle multiple 
trains,  only one  train is specified  here. 
TRAIN  = 
(IN-TRANSIT); 
(GATE  ! a +  AT-INTERSECTION); 
(GATE  ! d +  TRAIN) 
GATE  = 
(TRAIN  ? a +  CLOSE): 
(TRAIN  ? d +  OPEN-+  GATE) 
RAIL-ROAD-CROSSING  = 
TRAIN  ia,dj  GATE  II 
This specification  shows  two concurrent  processes,  the 
TRAIN  and the GATE communicating via two activities, 
“a”  and “d.”  The TRAIN  outputs “a”  (arriving)  to the 
GATE as it approaches  the intersection;  proceeds  through 
the intersection  and outputs  a “d” (departing)  to the GATE 
as it leaves  the intersection and continues to behave  as a 
TRAIN.  The GATE  process receives an “a”  from  the 
TRAIN, closes  the gate,  waits for an input of “d” from the 
TRAIN  before opening the gate and then behaves  like a 
GATE. A few comments  about the CSP specification are 
in order. The original CSP  does  not permit specification  of 
time with  actions, although some recent extensions to 
CSP permit the association  of time with actions. Because 
CSP uses  point-to-point communication it is awkward to 
describe  the case  where the GATE process  accepts  inputs 
from multiple TRAIN  processes.  Careful scrutiny reveals 
that the TRAIN  process could  enter the  intersection 
(AT-INTERSECTION) before the gate  closes  which leads 
to unsafe  behavior. Likewise, the train may depart while 
the gate is still closed which can be viewed as a fail-safe 
behavior.  The Petri net equivalent  reveals  these  flaws more 
readily (see  Figures  1 and  2). 
2.2  Stochastic  Petri  Nets.  The  Petri  net  was 
originally due to Carl Petri. In its simplest form, a Petri 
net is a directed bipartite graph, where the two types of 
nodes are  known  as  places  (shown  as  circles)  and 
transitions (shown as bars). Places normally  represent 
events  while transitions represent  actions. A transition is 
enabled  if all its inputs contain at least one token (shown 
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defined  by a transition  causes  a token  to be assigned  to each 
of  its output places. When a place is the input to more 
than one transition, only one of the transitions  is enabled 
based  on a non-deterministic  choice.  The state  of a Petri net 
is indicated  by the number  and location  of tokens  in places 
(known as a marking), and as transitions  are enabled,  the 
state  of the Petri net moves  from marking to marking.  The 
complete set of markings of a Petri net can be obtained 
using  reachability  algorithms.  When a Petri net is restricted 
to contain at most one token in a place (or a finite number 
of tokens, say k), such a Petri net is known as a safe net 
(or k-safe). 
These initial  concepts  have been extended  to permit 
probabilistic choices on the outputs of a place, inhibitor 
arcs to  transitions (i.e.,  a transition  is enabled in  the 
absence  of  a token at its input place and such arcs can 
model zero testing), as well as the association  of time and 
distributions with either places  or transitions.  See  [Murata 
891 for an excellent survey of Petri nets.  We will  rely on 
the stochastic Petri nets that permit the association of 
various probability distributions with transitions  to model 
performance and reliability  of  the system. A  stochastic 
Petri net (SPN) is a Petri net where each transition is 
associated  with a random variable  that expresses  the delay 
from the enabling to  the firing  of  the transition. When 
multiple  transitions are enabled, the transition  with  a 
minimum delay fires first. When the random variable is 
exponential, the markings of the stochastic  Petri net are 
isomorphic to the states of  a finite  Markov chain. The 
transition rate from state Mi to Mj = qij is given by qij = 
hi1 + hi2  + . . .+him  where hik  is the delay in firing  a 
transition tk which takes  the Petri net from marking  Mi to 
Mj (when more than one transition  can  cause the transition 
from Mi to Mj).  The performance  and reliability analyses 
of the system  represented  by the Petri net can be achieved 
by using  an equivalent  Markov process. 
2.3  Mapping  of  CSP-Level  Specifications  into 
Petri  Nets.  We have developed  an initial set of rules for 
translating CSP specifications into Petri nets [Kavi 931. 
The translation relies on the fact that CSP specifications 
are  based  on processes  moving form one action to another. 
The acriviries  which enable  the actions  of processes  can  be 
viewed as the events  which are represented  by w  in a 
Petri net, while the actions  are viewed as lransitions in 
Petri nets.  The translations  between  the CSP and Petri net 
models have not been formally verified to be isomorphic. 
However,  we  have  developed rules  which  show the 
associated Petri  net structure for  the majority  of  CSP 
process structures  and  compositions.  The  Petri  net 
equivalent of  a CSP specification need not be unique, 
because of  the  need to  introduce  dummy  places or 
transitions  to maintain its bipartite nature.  Intuitively, it is 
possible to reduce different Petri net equivalents into a 
canonical  form. We plan to develop  the necessary  rules for 
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Hawaii  International  Conference on System  Sciences  -  19% 
producing canonical Petri  net representations of  CSP 
specifications. 
Our goal is to demonstrate  the feasibility of translating 
between  CSP and Petri nets so that stochastic  properties 
can be specified at the CSP level, and analyzed using 
stochastic  Petri nets. Some  example translations  between 
CSP specifications and  Petri  nets are  shown  in  the 
Appendix.  Using  these, we  have converted  the  CSP 
example  of the Rail-Road  Crossing. 
2.3.1  PETRI  NET FOR THE RAIL-ROAD  CROSSING 
EXAMPLE, The Rail-Road crossing presents a safety 
critical system  where  two tasks  that operate  independently 
must communicate  in order to coordinate  closing the gate 
when the train nears  the crossing. The gate must remain 
closed  until the train passes  though. The Petri net is shown 
in Figure 1. 
As stated  earlier  (12.1.  l), a careful scrutiny  reveals  that 
the TRAIN process  &  enter the intersection  before the 
gate  closes,  exposing  the system  to unsafe  behavior. This 
potential flaw becomes  immediately  visible from the Petri 
net shown in Figure 1. If  we assume  that the gate always 
opens  and closes  sooner  than the time it takes  the train to 
reach the crossing,  the Petri net can be viewed as hazard 
free. 
Obviously some  mechanism  is needed  to ensure  that 
the train will  not proceed unless the gate is closed. One 
way to redesign  the system  is to force the TRAIN process 
to wait until the GATE process  completes  CLOSEing the 
gate  which will avoid such unsafe  behavior. The Petri net 
of Figure 2 shows  the additional synchronization  (and its 
corresponding  CSP)  that is necessary  to ensure  the system 
will operate  in such a manner. 
In Figure 2, a failure of  the communication related 
actions may lead to a deadlock (the train will  halt), but 
synchronization  between  the TRAIN and GATE eliminates 
the possibility of  trains passing through the intersection 
un-guarded  by an open gate. Failure to OPEN the gate is 
not  safety critical,  yet  should be  avoided  to  prevent 
congestion of  the associated infrastructure. It  may be 
possible  to use Reward nets (and performability analyses) 
to associate  a cost with such  delays  in opening  of the gate. 
~.SPECIFICATION  OF STOCHASTIC 
PROPERTIES 
One of  the major objectives of  our research is to 
provide assistance  to  the  user in  specifying  not  only 
functionality  but  also  reliability,  performance  and 
execution deadlines. In  this paper we show how this is 
facilitated by the translation of  CSP specifications into 
Stochastic  Petri nets.  One important benefit, as we have 
already  shown,  is how the Petri net (PN) equivalent  of the 
Rail-Road crossing elucidated the need for  additional 
synchronization  to avoid a safety-critical  failure. 
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TRAIN =  (IN-TRANSIT); 
(GATE ! a +  AT-INTERSECTION); 
(GATE ! d +  TRAIN) 
GATE =  (TRAIN ? a +  CLOSE); 
(TRAIN ? d --t OPEN + 
RAIL~ROAD~CROSSING = 
Figure 1 Rail-Road  Crossing  with a Potential  Hazard  (unsafe  PN Specification). 
TRAIN =  (IN-TRANSIT); 
(GATE ! a +  GATE ? ok +  AT-INTERSECTION); 
(GATE ! d +  TRAIN) 
GATE =  (TRAIN ? a +  CLOSE +  TRAIN ! ok); 
SAFERJ3!?$i~~~~R~:~N~  :%.1N  II(a,ok,d) GATE 
1  TRAIN 
Figure  2 Rail-Road  Crossing  with a Hazard  Eliminated. 
Proceedings of the 28th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'95) 
1060-3425/95 $10.00 © 1995 IEEE Proceedings of the 28th Annual  Hawaii  International  Conference on System Sciences -  1995 
3.1  Failure  Modes  for  the  Rail-Road  Crossing. 
Using the Petri net of Figure 1, we will  assume  that all 
transitions can fail.  It  should be noted however, that the 
Petri net of Figure 1 is unsafe,  but for the purpose  of the 
example here, we assume the Petri net to be safe (i.e., 
permit at most one token at a place). The Markings are 
shown in Figure 3. Note that PcF and PNF are places  not 
identified in the Petri net but are used  to designate  critical 
and  noncritical failure events  respectively. 
Markings M5 and M6 are critical markings resulting 
from slow firing  of transitions (?a [ts]) and (Close [t6]) 
because  it is possible for the train to enter the intersection 
before  the  gate has properly  (or  completely)  closed. 
Similarly  markings  Ml1  and Ml2  occur due to a slow 
firing of transitions (?d [t7]) and (Open [@I) because  it is 
possible  for the train to depart  from the intersection  and  not 
have  the gate  properly (or completely)  open,  although  these 
markings  do not lead to a safety  critical condition.  Figure  4 
shows the Markov process  based on the stochastic  Petri 
net. For analysis  purposes,  we will generally  group  failures 
into safety-critical (CF) and non-(safety-)critical (NF). A 
failure  in  sending or  receiving  the approaching (“a”) 
message  and the closing of the gate  are safety-critical.  The 
CSP specification (and the corresponding  Petri net) can be 
augmented  to show how such failures should be handled. 
For example, the communication failures can be.  handled 
using time-out and re-transmit techniques.  The failure of 
the gate closing action can be handled  by sounding  a loud 
alarm  to alert  pedestrians  and  traffic. 
3.2  Stochastic  Analysis.  Using  conventional 
techniques or  stochastic Petri  net tools  (e.g., SPNP), 
discrete  and continuous  analyses  can be performed.  For the 
purpose  of this presentation,  we have  used  Mathematicao 
to compute reliability  of  the rail-road crossing example 
with  different failure rates (or probabilities) and service 
rates (e.g., speed of  the train,  rate at which  the gate 
mechanism  operates).  The values used in this paper (and 
hence the results of the analysis) are only for illustrating 
the approach.  It is not our intention to attach significance 
to the failure rates, MTTFs obtained,  or the probability of 
detected  and  undetected  failures.  These  analyses  are  useful  in 
exploring different fault-handling mechanisms  and the cost 
of providing fault tolerance.  For example, more elaborate 
fault-handling  and fault-recovery  mechanisms  could be used 
to tolerate or prevent safety critical  failures, while less 
attention may be paid to non-safety critical failures (see 
runs 2, 3, and 4 in Figures 5-6). Failure to open the gate 
may anger  people waiting at the crossing  but such  failures 
can  be handled  inexpensively  by providing a mechanism  to 
manually open the gate.  On the other hand,  failure to close 
the gate  is more severe,  so traffic at the crossing  should  be 
alerted  reliably and  automatically. 
3.2.1  DISCRETE  ANALYSIS.  Table  1 presents the 
probability assignments  for our test runs of the Rail-Road 
crossing  example.  Table  2  shows  the  results of  the 
stochastic  analysis.  In  all  runs  we  assume that  the 
mechanical  failures have  higher probabilities  of failure than 
transmission  failures. In order to reduce  the probability of 
critical failures, in runs 2, 3, and 4 we assume  that fault- 
tolerant  mechanisms are utilized  to  improve  the  gate 
closing mechanism’s  reliability  (as compared to the gate 
opening mechanism  which is a non-critical failure) by the 
factors of  100, 3, and 5 respectively. This achieved a 
reduction in  the probability  of  critical  failures  by  the 
factors of  17.5, 1.24, and 1.75. Such an analysis of  the 
improvements  in the probability of critical failures can be 
used  in deciding  what level of fault tolerance  is necessary. 
3.2.2  CONTINUOUS  ANALYSIS.  The results of  our 
continuous  analysis  are shown in Figure 5. We have also 
investigated  the trade-offs  between  the rate of train arrivals 
(p,),  the speed of  the train  (p3),  the rate of  the gate 
mechanism  (~16,  us) and the failure rates  associated  with the 
signal transmission (h2, hq, hS, h7) and the mechanical 
failures (gate mechanism,  &,  hs). These  results are shown 
in Table 2. Since we assume  that signal transmissions  are 
more reliable than the gate’s  mechanical mechanism,  we 
notice that the reliability  of signal transmission does not 
significantly  impact the MTTF.  Thus,  the mechanical 
failures of the gate and the rate of gate closing (opening) 
are greater  contributors to the reliability  (or unreliability) 
of  system. An  interesting result of  this analysis is that 
when  the  train  speed is  such  that  it  arrives  at  the 
intersection sooner than the gate has had time to close, 
then an improvement  in the mechanical  reliability will  not 
improve  the  system’s reliability.  This  supports  our 
statements  about the need for additional synchronization 
between  the TRAIN and the GATE processes  (Figure 2). 
4.Smiv~RY  AND FUTURE  WORK 
Our  objective  in  this  paper  is  to  show  how  CSP 
specifications  can be translated into Stochastic  Petri nets 
for the purpose of reliability  and performance analyses. 
Such translations  will  give insight into the failure modes, 
and how fault handling mechanisms  can be described  as a 
part  of  the  CSP specifications.  We  believe  that  our 
approach  will provide the needed  feedback  to a designer  so 
that judicious  cost-benefit analysis in  providing  fault- 
tolerance  can  be made.  In this paper  we have  illustrated this 
approach  by  using  a  simple  example.  The  failure 
probabilities used  in the examples  (hence  the results  of the 
analysis)  are  for  illustrating  our  approach, no  other 
significance should be attached.  Our only intention is to 
show the complete process  of specification and analysis. 
We hope to develop a tool for automatically translating 
CSP  specifications  into Petri nets  in order to use  stochastic 
Petri net tools for the purpose  of analysis. 
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Ml:  ’ 
8  p9  ptO  PCF  PNF 
(1  o-  o-  o-  o-  ov  ;  0  0  0  0  0)  Train  gone,  gate  open 
vI2:  (0  1  0  0  0  0  10  0  0  0  0)  Train  in transit,  gate  open 
1:;  (0 
(0 
0  0  1  I  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  10  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0) 
0) 
Train  Train  sends  approaching  rcv’d  msg,  and  gate  open 
approaching,  msg  gate  closing 
MS:  (0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0)  Train  approaching/waiting,  gate  closed 
;;I;  (0 
(0 
0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  10  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0) 
0) 
Train  Train  at  at intersection,  approaching  rcv’d  and  msg  not  rcv’d 
intersection,  msg  gate  closing 
Ma:  (0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0)  Train  at intersection,  gate  closed 
M9:  (1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0)  Train  sends  departing  gate  closed  msg, 
MlO:  (1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0)  Train  gone,  msg  gate  received  and  is opening 
Mll”:  (0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0)  Train  in transit,  but  gate  hasn’t  received  msg 
Ml 2’*:  (0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0)  Train  in transit,  gate  received  and  is openins  msg 
‘Cntical  mndllon.  Tran  at  lntenecllon  but  gate  IS  still  apen  **Noncritical  condillon.  Trrn  departed  intersection  but  the  gate  8s still  closed 
Figure 3 Markings (Ml  - 12) Based  on the Hazardous  Rail-Road  Crossing  PN Specification. 
, Indicates  a  tm-e  transition 
lfalure  IMV  rowIt  from  debved  transltlon)  communwtaon  failure 
+  MC,  Communication  failure  transitions:  (t,,  t7, tb, t2} 
IMW,),  W&h  Ml Wd,  Ml  l(b),  M1%3,)j +  MNC 
Mechanical  failure  in transitions: 
Absorb  transitions: 
ps  ); 
I,  ? 
Figure 4 Markov Chain for Rail-Road  crossing  based  on unsafe  PN Specification. 
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Table 1 Discrete  Analysis: Probability Assignments 
p&l  1 1  .O  e -2  l.Oe-3  3.0 e -2  5.0 e -3  Probability of gate open failure 
Table 2 Discrete  Analysis: MTIF,  Critical and  Non-critical Failure Probabilities. 
RunNumber  MTTF  MCF  MNC 
Run  1  392.20474  0.5026  0.4974 
Run 2  7619.24626  0.0286  0.9714 
Run 3  159.50404  0.4033  0.5967 
Run 4  1138.50228  0.2862  0.7138 
5 Continuous  Analysis: System  Reliability as  a Function of Operational  Time 
1 
2000  4000  6000  a000  10000 
Time in  Seconds 
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p1  =  0.0001 
TABLE 3 Continuous  Analysis:  Sensitivity  Analysis 
k2 = h4 = h5  MTTF  k1  =  0.0001  h2 = hq = hg 
= k7’  0.00001  = h7=  0.00001 
p2= 0.01 ; pfj = 0.01  h6 = hg = 0.001  5622  /.l2=  0.~1  ; jl6 = 0.01  h(j = hf3  = 0.001  10107 
h6 = h8 = 0.~01  5201  h6 = hg = 0.~1  10151 
hh  = hn  =  0.0001  5156  hh  = hn  =  0.0001  10549 
p2= o.t)ol  ; pfj = 0.01  h6 = 18 = 0.001  6069  j.l’J=  0.001 ; /.l6  = 0.~1  16 = 18 = 0.~1  12602 
h6 = 18 = o.o()ol  5651  h(j = h&3  = o.ml  11404 
hf;  = hn  =  0.0001  5606.  hh  = hn  =  o.ooo1  11046 
APPENDIX  CSP TOPETRINETTRANSLATIONS 
a +  (b I%)  and (b llc)  +  a  (a +  b +  c) \ b) 
:  :.  ..  .  . 0  :. ? 
& 
“’  i.:.  a 
,:  .  .  .  .  . : 
,/:.  .  .  .  .  .  .  ;  :. 
T” 
a +  (b 11  c) and (b 11  c) -+ a 
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